What do the chechen separatists want

Located in the northern part of the Caucasus mountain range, Chechnya's 1. Between the 16th and 19th centuries, most of the country's residents converted to Sunni Islam, siding with the Ottoman Empire against ongoing annexation by the Russian Empire.

Grozny, a city of roughly , on the Sunzha River, is the republic's capital. What is Chechnya's history with Russia? Why is it important? For two centuries, Chechnya and Russia have been constantly intertwined , often erupting in violence and oppression. The Russian Empire expanded into the Caucasus region during the the 19th century, annexing Chechnya against its will. Today, Russia continues to maintain a vital interest in the region for economic reasons: Access routes from Russia to the Black Sea and Caspian Sea go through Chechnya, as do oil and gas pipelines connecting Russia with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

During two centuries of mostly Russian rule, Chechnya has intermittently achieved de facto autonomy during times of Russian upheaval. In , at the start of the Russian Civil War, the country declared its independence, only to be suppressed and reclaimed in The Soviets then merged the Chechens with a neighboring territory in to reduce both group's ethnic identity.

He had the entire population banished to Kazakhstan and Siberia in , killing tens of thousands of Chechens in the process. In , five years after Stalin's death, survivors were allowed to return home and Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, restored the province.

The country remainder under Soviet rule until the fall of the Soviet Union in Inspired by neighboring Georgia's recent successful secession attempt, a Chechen separatist movement formed following the Soviet collapse. Russia refused to allow the region to secede, sparking two wars. Russia withdrew and declared a cease-fire in after a long, bloody conflict. Russian news reports claimed—presumably on the basis of information from local security services—that Chitigov had served as a U.

Marine and that he was wearing a dog tag when killed; however, the inscription reportedly on the tag does not match the U. Marine Corps format. See details below. Remarks by Putin and his subordinates can be broken into two distinct claims:. Checking Claim 1 : U. The U. State Department officials in early , October and March , in spite of Russian objections ; the late Sen.

According to Brian G. Russian authorities, however, maintained that Akhmadov was connected with terrorist activity; Akhmadov denied these accusations. In August , Russian officials stated that Russia had asked Interpol to add Akhmadov to its wanted list and that the Russian government had asked the U. Checking Claim 2 : The U. Multiple searches of open sources by our team of researchers has yielded no evidence of the U. Needless to say, such claims are difficult to either verify or disprove.

As noted above, one search of open sources netted a claim by the FSB that Chechen rebel Chitigov may have been a CIA agent; that claim did not include any corroborating evidence. Both Kommersant and Lenta. Both requests revealed no documents related to an individual of that name.

Claims of American weapons being found in Chechnya have been used to support the idea that the U. While reports often claim that Kadyrov alone controls Chechnya, it is widely acknowledged that separate parts of the republic are controlled by other pro-Kremlin figures, including Sulim Yamadayev and Sayed-Magomed Kakiyev. Relations between these groups appear to have soured in recent months, indicating a power struggle of sorts within pro-Kremlin Chechen groups.

Thus, the ability to maintain control of the republic, and indeed, to target and "liquidate" particular figures such as Maskhadov, Sadullayev and prominent foreign figures like Abu Hafs, may well have resulted from information-sharing across these groups, and even from competition between them. Since July , it has often been repeated that the death of particular figures in the Chechen movement such as Aslan Maskhadov or even Shamil Basayev marked the beginning of the decline in the Chechen separatist movement.

But the focus on Arab fighters only offers an explanation of a small dimension of the separatist movement. A far more important characteristic of the current separatist movement is its links to the Diaspora communities and to regional affiliates and the role of Sufi networks.

For instance, a significant Chechen Diaspora community exists not only in Jordan and Azerbaijan but also in Turkey, and of course, in Kazakhstan. While Sheik Fathi died in the latter part of , another young Jordanian-Chechen, Abdurakhman, took the reins of the Islamic Jamaat movement in Chechnya. Therefore, those who are often labelled as Arab fighters may in fact be linked to Chechnya, not by radical groups, but instead by the Diaspora community.

The current command structure of the Chechen separatist movement incorporates regional affiliates, Arab representatives and seasoned Chechen fighters. But the command of the current separatist movement, under the leadership of Dokku Umarov, also highlights the diversity of Islam. Umarov took up the reins of the movement following the death of Abdul-Khalim Sadullayev in Sadullayev, a young radical Chechen ideologist, was closely tied to the radical Islamists in the movement, but acted as a key figure linking Basayev, Abu Hafs and younger members of the movement to other ethnic groups.

By contrast, Umarov is a veteran fighter, and a Sufi. He has spent some time linking the movement to its earlier forms, as advocated by Sadullayev and, more generally, Maskhadov. Tellingly, this indicates that the movement is aligning itself on a regional anti-Russian "anti-colonial" platform, and has suggested that the attacks against Chechen "collaborators" are an important element of the ongoing struggle.

He has also argued for attacks on targets across Russia, and has incorporated key figures from regional groups and the Diaspora community into the movement's high command.

The acceptance of certain fighters into the hierarchy of the separatist movement, particularly those with significant sources of funding, is one marker. Again, though, a note of caution must be sounded, precisely because the movement, especially in more recent years, may not operate with a standard hierarchical command and control structure. Instead, the social, cultural and clan networks, alongside the role of particular warlords and jamaats associated with other ethnic groups Ingush, Nogai, Dagestani , may be operating in a more informal way; posing the problem of a regional and asymmetrical threat.

Therefore, to claim insight into the radicalisation of the movement as being due, for example, to the role of Khattab, is to make two rather important mistakes; it fails to recognise the diversity in the movement or its presence as a network; nor does such an approach recognise that Khattab was but one of a number of foreign fighters who themselves may be linked to movements which have themselves become transformed over time.

Of course, time will tell if the death of Abu Hafs will have a direct impact on the Chechen separatist movement. It is clear, however, that the Russian policy of liquidating alleged representatives of Al Qaida cannot continue, simply because few figures remain who can be directly or even indirectly linked with Al Qaeda.

Instead, a new generation of fighters, mainly drawing on the jamaat groups and regional networks, is now represented by a cell of foreign fighters, with Muhannad as its representative.

Clearly some elements of the Chechen movement have become radicalised. Nevertheless, the fracturing of Chechen resistance after and the exploitation of a power vacuum in Chechnya proper by a small number of Islamists throughout , do not necessarily amount to radicalisation.